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A TREASURED INSTITUTION, A TROUBLED
IDENTITY, AND THE THREAT OF DENOTATION:
WHETHER THE SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION IS AN
EXECUTIVE AGENCY UNDER 5 U.S.C. § 105 AND
WHY IT MATTERS
Nicole Picard+
Bequeathed to the United States in 1826 by James Smithson,1 governed by
statute,2 and aimed at the "increase and diffusion of knowledge," 3 the
Smithsonian Institution ("Smithsonian" or "Institution") has become a well-
respected, oft-visited, world-renowned collection of museums and research
centers. 4 Despite boasting an expansive and unique collection of "more than
137 million artifacts, works of art and scientific specimen,"5 this self-
proclaimed "steward to our nation's historic, scientific, artistic and cultural
heritage' 6 exists beneath a cloud of denotative uncertainty.
+ J.D. Candidate, May 2011, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law;
B.A., 2008, Providence College. The author wishes to extend gratitude to Professor Amanda C.
Leiter and Mr. Gordon Jimison for their invaluable attention, help, and guidance. She also wishes
to thank her parents for their steadfast support throughout every endeavor. This Comment is
dedicated to Theresa Comtois for her enduring encouragement.
1. See Samuel Pierpont Langley, James Smithson, in THE SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION,
1846-1896: THE HISTORY OF ITS FIRST HALF CENTURY 1, 19 (George Brown Goode ed., 1897)
(noting that James Smithson established his will on October 23, 1826). This will devised to his
nephew, for life, all of Smithson's possessions, but provided that
[i]n the case of the death of my said Nephew without leaving a child or children, or
the death of the child or children he may have had under the age of twenty-one years or
intestate, I then bequeath the whole of my property... to the United States of America,
to [be] found at Washington, under the name of the Smithsonian Institution, an
Establishment for the increase & diffusion of knowledge among men.
Id. at 20.
2. See 20 U.S.C. §§41-70 (2006).
3. 20 U.S.C. § 41 ("The President, the Vice President, the Chief Justice, and the heads of
executive departments are constituted an establishment by the name of the Smithsonian
Institution for the increase and diffusion of knowledge among men ... " (emphasis added)); see
SMITHSONIAN INST., MANAGEMENT'S DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS FY 2008 1, 5 (2008),
available at http://www.si.edu/opanda/docs/Smithsonian%201nstitutionMDAFY2008.pdf
[hereinafter MANAGEMENT'S DISCUSSION].
4. MANAGEMENT'S DISCUSSION, supra note 3, at 1 ("[The Smithsonian] has evolved to
become the world's largest museum and research complex .... With 19 museums, numerous
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This uncertainty results from the Smithsonian's ambiguous place in the
structure of American government. As a codified gift receiving both private
and public funding,7 the Institution has been described as a "historical and
legal anomaly,"'8 "a very unusual entity,"9 "sui generis,"'10 and "unique unto its
own terms." 11 As such, it is facially unclear how the Smithsonian fits into the
American tripartite schematic 2-in particular, whether it is an executive
agency for purposes of Title 5 of the United States Code.'
3
Title 5 defines an executive agency as "an Executive department, a
Government corporation, and an independent establishment."' 14  In turn, an
independent establishment is "an establishment in the executive branch . . .
which is not an Executive department, military department, Government
corporation, or part thereof, or part of an independent establishment."'
15
Despite these definitions, the Institution's unique governing structure, method
of establishment, funding sources, and general functions make discerning its
identity a difficult endeavor.1
6
Because the Smithsonian thrives well, this search for a clear denotation may
seem a futile one. Courts, however, often have grappled with this issue in
determining whether certain statutes apply to the Smithsonian and have
reached inconsistent conclusions.' 7  In determining with which statutes the
7. SMITHSONIAN INST., FY 2007 SMITHSONIAN BUDGET SOURCES (2007), available at
http://www.si.edu/about/documents/fy07_SI budget source.pdf [hereinafter FY 2007 BUDGET
SOURCES] (reporting that the budget receives about sixty-two percent of its funding from federal
appropriations and the remainder from trust funds).
8. 12 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 122, 123 (1988) (quoting Memorandum from Theodore B.
Olson, Assistant Attorney Gen., to the Attorney Gen. I (May 23, 1983)).
9. Id. (quoting Memorandum from Theodore B. Olson, Assistant Attorney Gen., to the
Attorney Gen. 1).
10. Id. (quoting 3 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 274, 277 (1979)). "Sui generis" is defined as
"[o]f its own kind or class; unique or peculiar." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1572 (9th ed. 2009).
11. 12 Op. Off. Legal Counsel at 123 (quoting Memorandum from Leon Ulman, Deputy
Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to Peter Powers, Gen. Counsel, the
Smithsonian Inst. 9 (Feb. 19, 1976)).
12. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § I ("All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress of the United States .... "); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 ("The executive Power shall be
vested in a President of the United States of America."); U.S. CONST. art. IllI, § I ("The judicial
Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as
the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.").
13. See 5 U.S.C. § 105 (2006) ("For the purpose of this title, 'Executive agency' means an
Executive department, a Government corporation, and an independent establishment.").
14. Id. (emphasis added).
15. Id. § 104.
16. See infra note 62.
17. Compare Dong v. Smithsonian Inst., 125 F.3d 877, 879 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (finding that
the Smithsonian is not an establishment in the executive branch and, therefore, is not an agency
subject to the Privacy Act), with Pessa v. Smithsonian Inst., 60 M.S.P.R. 421, 425 (1994)
(holding that the Smithsonian is an independent establishment and, therefore, is an executive
agency for purposes of 5 U.S.C. § 105).
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Smithsonian must comply, it is necessary to ascertain whether this entity of
great historical and cultural significance is an executive agency as defined by
Title 5. A close analysis of its characteristics, mode of establishment, and
similarities to other independent establishments reveals that the Smithsonian
should be considered an executive agency subject to applicable Code
provisions. 18 This identity, however, may prove detrimental to the Institution.
This Comment discusses the varying approaches that courts and relevant
authorities have taken in analyzing the Smithsonian's status as an executive
agency. It first explores the idea of an independent establishment. Then, it
reviews relevant cases and authorities that have wrestled with this issue. Next,
this Comment analyzes the determinations rejecting the theory that the
Smithsonian is an executive agency before assessing authority supporting the
opposite proposition. Addressing the various interpretations and employing
the analytical techniques authorities have used, this Comment then explores the
possibility that the Smithsonian is an executive agency, ultimately determining
that it is. Finally, this Comment discusses the implications that this
classification has for the Institution and concludes that, although the
Smithsonian is an executive agency, Congress should consider redefining it
and setting parameters for applicable statutes and directives in order to
preserve the Institution's unique nature.
I. THE SMITHSONIAN'S ESTABLISHMENT AND THE CONCLUSIONS OF VARIOUS
AUTHORITIES PROVIDE A SHAKY FRAMEWORK FOR THE DISCUSSION OF
WHETHER THE SMITHSONIAN IS AN EXECUTIVE AGENCY
An overview of judicial decisions and the analyses of other relevant
authorities regarding the Smithsonian's identity reveal that the debate is a live
one, with no certain conclusion.
19
A. The Birth of the Smithsonian Institution
The Smithsonian Institution, a trust instrumentality of the United States,
20
was founded in 1846 "for the increase and diffusion of knowledge among
men.'21 Its founding was premised on James Smithson's will, 2 2 which devised
to the United States all of Smithson's property and required that it be located in
18. See infra Part II.B.
19. See infra Part I.C-D.
20. MANAGEMENT'S DISCUSSION, supra note 3, at 6.
21. 20 U.S.C. § 41 (2006).
22. See supra note 1. Interestingly, Smithson's motive in devising his property to the
United States is unknown. Langley, supra note 1, at 22. Smithson had no ties to anyone in the
United States, nor did any of his effects reference the United States or its countrymen. Id. The
language of his will, see supra note 1, however, parallels President Washington's farewell
address: "'Promote, as an object of primary importance, institutions for the general diffusion of
knowledge."' Id.
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Washington, D.C., and be known as the Smithsonian Institution.23 Congress
accepted this gift24 and codified the Smithsonian's existence, providing for its
purpose, governance, and financing.25 Since its inception, the Institution, with
nineteen museums and numerous research centers, "has evolved to become the
world's largest museum and research complex."
26
The Smithsonian takes as its charter 20 U.S.C. §§ 41-70, which incorporates
the Institution and establishes a governing body, the Board of Regents (the
Board).27 This Board, composed of "the Vice President, the Chief Justice of
the United States, three Members of the Senate, three Members of the House of
Representatives, and nine other persons,, 28 regulates itself through a series of
bylaws and internal leadership.29 These regulations contain specific provisions
addressing, inter alia, the meetings, 30 committees, 31 and chairmanship of the
Board.32 The fact that each branch of government is represented on the Board,
along with appointed private citizens, contributes to the initial uncertainty of
the Institution's place in American government.
B. An Independent Establishment Is an Executive Agency for Purposes of
Title 5
In order to determine where the Smithsonian falls within the three branches
of government and, more pointedly, whether it is an executive agency, it is
helpful to consider the statute defining executive agency. Title 5 provides a
seemingly straightforward definition: "For the purpose of this title, 'Executive
agency' means an Executive department, a Government corporation, and an
independent establishment."'34  An independent establishment,35 in turn, is
23. See Langley, supra note 1, at 20; see also SMITHSONIAN INST., A SMITHSONIAN FOR
THE FUTURE: SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION STRATEGIC PLAN FISCAL YEARS 2006 TO 2011 1
(2006), available at http://www.si.edu/about/documents/sistrategicplan2006to201 l.pdf
(acknowledging that Smithson gave his estate "to the United States of America, to found at
Washington, under the name of the Smithsonian Institution, an Establishment for the increase and
diffusion of knowledge").
24. See Act of July 1, 1836, ch. 252, § 1, 5 Stat. 64, 64 (empowering the President to
appoint an agent to ensure the proper establishment and finance of the Smithsonian).
25. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 41-70 (2006).
26. MANAGEMENT'S DISCUSSION, supra note 3, at 1.
27. See 20 U.S.C. §§41,42.
28. 20 U.S.C. § 42.
29. See generally SMITHSONIAN INST., BYLAWS OF THE BOARD OF REGENTS AND
CHARTER PROVISIONS OF THE SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION (2009), available at http://www.si.
edu/about/regents/documents/ BYLAWS%20AND%20CHARTER%2001-2009.pdf.
30. Id. §§ 2.04-13.
31. Id. §§4.01 -. 11.
32. Id. § 5.02.
33. See 20 U.S.C. § 42.
34. 5 U.S.C. § 105 (2006).
35. Because the courts grapple with this classification and it is the most plausible argument
that the Institution is an executive agency, this Comment focuses on the identity of the
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defined for purposes of Title 5 as "an establishment in the executive branch...
which is not an Executive department, military department, Government
corporation, or part thereof, or part of an independent establishment.
'" 36
Accordingly, in order for the Smithsonian to be considered an independent
establishment, and therefore an executive agency, it must be (1) an
establishment and (2) housed within the executive branch.37
The first part of this analysis is easily satisfied. An establishment, according
to Black's Law Dictionary, is "the state or condition of being established... ;
[a]n institution or place of business." 38 The Smithsonian, being an institution
by its very name, fits the latter half of this definition.39  Additionally, its
founding document demonstrates that Congress intended the Smithsonian to be
an establishment by providing that "[t]he President, the Vice President, the
Chief Justice, and the heads of executive departments are constituted an
establishment by the name of the Smithsonian Institution."
40
The second part of the analysis, whether the Smithsonian is "an
establishment in the executive branch, '4 1 has been the source of much debate.
Smithsonian as an independent establishment and, thereby, an executive agency. See id.
(identifying independent establishments as executive agencies). Assessing the Smithsonian as an
"Executive department" or "a Government corporation" is outside the scope of this Comment.
36. Id. § 104(1). It cannot be ignored that, for the Smithsonian to be an independent
establishment, according to the statute, it cannot be an Executive department, military
department, government corporation, or part thereof, or part of an independent establishment. Id.
To determine if the Smithsonian fits into one of these designations, it is helpful to look to statutes
defining the respective entities. 501 U.S.C. § 101 lists the Executive departments as including all
the cabinet-level departments, such as the Department of State and the Department of Justice. Id.
§ 101. The list does not include the Smithsonian Institution, nor is the Smithsonian a department
of this nature. Likewise, the Smithsonian is not among the military departments, which consist of
the Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force.
Id. § 102. "Government corporation" is defined as a "corporation owned or controlled by the
Government of the United States." Id. § 103. Although the Smithsonian may arguably be
classified as a government corporation, case law does not directly address this, and the discussion
of this issue is outside the scope of this Comment. See Dong v. Smithsonian Inst., 125 F.3d 877,
879 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (reasoning that the Smithsonian is not a government-controlled corporation
because it is not an establishment in the executive branch, a term which necessarily encompasses
government-controlled corporations under the Privacy Act); Dodge v. Trs. of the Nat'l Gallery of
Art, 326 F. Supp. 2d 1, 11 (D.D.C. 2004) (citing Dong, 125 F.3d at 879) (reasoning that the
Smithsonian is not subject to the Privacy Act because it is not an "agency" under the Act's
definition). Lastly, the Smithsonian is not "part" of another larger entity. See Dong, 125 F.3d at
879, 883 (excluding the Smithsonian from the entities qualifying as agencies). Because it does
not qualify as an Executive department, a Government corporation, or part of another independent
establishment, this Comment analyzes the Smithsonian as an independent establishment.
37. See 5 U.S.C. § 104(1).
38. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 626 (9th ed. 2009) (emphasis added).
39. See 20 U.S.C. § 41 (2006) ("The President, the Vice President, the Chief Justice, and the
heads of executive departments are constituted an establishment by the name of the Smithsonian
Institution for the increase and diffusion of knowledge among men." (emphasis added)).
40. Id. (emphasis added).
41. 5 U.S.C. § 104 (emphasis added).
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In attempting to settle this issue, courts have varied in both methodology and
outcome.
42
Identity as an independent establishment is not an issue specific to the
Smithsonian, however. Courts have grappled with the concept of independent
establishments and have attempted to define the precise characteristics of suchS• 43
entities with regard to many other institutions and organizations. In doing so,
courts often look to the denotative provisions of Title 5, namely 5 U.S.C. §§
104 and 105.44
For example, the Second Circuit rejected the idea that the Office of Inspector
General of the Department of Justice (OIG) was an independent establishment
and, therefore, an executive agency under the Federal Labor Management
Relations Act (FLMRA).45  After acknowledging the division among the
circuits,46 the court concluded that components of larger agencies or
departments are not independent establishments and are, therefore, not
42. Compare Dong v. Smithsonian Inst., 125 F.3d 877, 879 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (finding that
the Smithsonian is not an agency for purposes of the Privacy Act), with Expeditions Unlimited
Aquatic Enters., Inc. v. Smithsonian Inst., 566 F.2d 289, 296 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (determining that
the Smithsonian is an independent establishment in the executive branch for purposes of the
Federal Torts Claims Act).
43. See, e.g., Fed. Labor Relations Auth. v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 137 F.3d 683, 688-89 (2d
Cir. 1997) (finding that parts of Executive departments are not independent establishments),
vacated, 527 U.S. 1031 (1999); Haddon v. Walters, 43 F.3d 1488, 1490 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (per
curiam) (distinguishing the Executive Residence from independent establishments).
44. See, e.g., Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 137 F.3d at 688-89 (examining the definition of
executive agency in 5 U.S.C. § 105, thus prompting an examination of the definition of
independent establishment in § 104).
45. Id. at 689, vacated, 527 U.S. 1031, 1031 (1999) (remanding in light of its decision in
Nat'l Aeronautics & Space Admin. v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 527 U.S. 229 (1999)).
Although the Second Circuit's decision was vacated, the Court in National Aeronautics & Space
Administration v. Federal Labor Relations Authority did not address the issue of whether the OIG
was an independent establishment subject to the FLMRA and therefore did not change the
analysis offered by the Second Circuit. See Nat'l Aeronautics & Space Admin., 527 U.S. at 231.
The FLMRA defines "agency" as "an Executive agency .... the Library of Congress, the
Government Printing Office and the Smithsonian Institution." 5 U.S.C. § 7103(3). The Second
Circuit considered the definition of executive agency in 5 U.S.C. § 105, which prompted its
discussion of independent establishments. See Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 137 F.3d at 688-89.
Additionally, that the Smithsonian Institution is considered an executive agency under the
FLMRA is a direct result of the Workforce Investment Act. Workforce Investment Act of 1988,
Pub. L. No. 105-220, § 341(e), 112 Stat. 936, 1092 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §
7103(a)(3)).
46. See Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 137 F.3d at 689 ("Whether this definition of
'independent establishment' includes the OIG of a cabinet department is a matter on which three
Circuits have divided.").
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executive agencies 47 subject to the FLMRA. 48 The court based its holding on
the definition of independent establishment, which explicitly excludes any
"[e]xecutive departments or parts thereof."49  Given that the Smithsonian's
governing statute does not establish it as a part of, beneath, or an extension of
another entity, a similar analysis would not exclude the Smithsonian from the
50independent-establishment category.
The District of Columbia Circuit, in Haddon v. Walters, took a similar
approach in deciding whether the Executive Residence51 is an independent
establishment and, thereby, an executive agency.52  It admitted that the
"definition of independent establishment does not clearly foreclose" the
argument that the Executive Residence is an independent establishment. 53 It
noted, however, that, in other provisions, Congress used the term "Executive
Residence" separately from independent establishment, suggesting that
Congress considered the entities distinct. 54 Accordingly, the court held that the
Residence is not an independent establishment.
55
Given the broad definition of independent establishment, courts have been
forced to look outside the plain language of 5 U.S.C. § 104 to determine
whether an entity is an independent establishment.56 The same technique alsomust apply to the question of the Smithsonian's identity.
47. Id. The Second Circuit also considered an Eleventh Circuit decision that, too, found that
the larger department is the "agency," but smaller components of the department are not. Id.
(citing Fed. Labor Relations Auth. v. Nat'l Aeronautics & Space Admin., 120 F.3d 1208, 1213
(11 th Cir. 1997)).
48. 5 U.S.C. § 7101-7106.
49. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 137 F.3d at 688-89; see 5 U.S.C. § 104.
50. See 20 U.S.C. § 41 (2006); see also MANAGEMENT'S DISCUSSION, supra note 3, at 5-6
(describing the Smithsonian as a unique entity that is not part of the executive branch).
51. "[T]he Executive Residence is exclusively dedicated to assisting the President in
maintaining his home and carrying out his various ceremonial duties." Marjorie A. Shields,
Annotation, What Constitutes "Agency "for Purposes of Freedom of Information Act, 165 A.L.R.
FED. 591 § 4(b) (2000). Interestingly, although serving as the home of the first family, the
Executive Residence has been described as a museum, a wedding chapel, a hotel, an art gallery, a
conference center, and a library. BRADLEY H. PATTERSON, To SERVE THE PRESIDENT:
CONTINUITY AND INNOVATION IN THE WHITE HOUSE STAFF 343 (2008).
52. See Haddon v. Walters, 43 F.3d 1488, 1489-90 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
53. Id. at 1490.
54. Id. (explaining that Congress used independent establishment separately from
"Executive Residence" in 3 U.S.C. § 112 and that this distinction "suggests that Congress does
not regard the Executive Residence to be an independent establishment"). Additionally, the
opinion distinguishes the definition of executive agency found in Title 5 from the definition found
in Title 3, which "addresses similar concerns [as Title 5] with respect to the President's advisors
and the staff of the Executive Residence." Id.; see also 3 U.S.C. § 112 (2006).
55. Haddon, 43 F.3d at 1490. The rationale employed by the Haddon court, which
distinguished the Executive Residence from independent establishments based on statutory
construction, similarly applies to the Smithsonian. See infra Part II.A. For purposes of the
Smithsonian, however, this reasoning is not determinative. See infra Part II.A.
56. See, e.g., Haddon, 43 F.3d at 1490.
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C. Some Authorities, Including the Smithsonian Itself Have Concluded that
the Institution Is Not an Independent Establishment
Before discussing judicial analyses, the Smithsonian's self-identity should
be considered. The Smithsonian claims that it exists outside the executive
branch, and therefore rejects an identity as an independent establishment. 57 It
asserts that, "[a]s a trust instrumentality of the United States, many of the laws
and directives applicable to federal agencies do not apply to the Institution. 5 8
The Institution further "perceives itself as 'not a government agency in any
ordinary use of the term, but [as] a charitable trust for the benefit of humankind
whose trustee is the United States.'
59
The Office of the Federal Register's United States Government Manual
takes a similar position in categorizing the Smithsonian as a "Quasi-Official
Agenc[y]. 6 °  By including the Smithsonian in this category, the authors
designate it as one of four entities that are not executive agencies, but that are
nonetheless subject to certain federal requirements.
62
57. See MANAGEMENT'S DISCUSSION, supra note 3, at 5 ("ITihe Smithsonian is not part of
the Executive Branch.").
58. Id. Contrarily, the Office of Legal Counsel observed that "[t]he Smithsonian considers
itself to be a 'Federal agency' but not an executive agency." 12 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 122, 125
(1988). This directly contradicts the assertion that the Institution is not subject to the same laws
as federal agencies, which are not necessarily executive agencies. Moreover, the Smithsonian has
argued that it is "within the term 'the United States' as used in [28 U.S.C.] § 1498(b)," O'Rourke
v. Smithsonian Inst. Press, 399 F.3d 113, 114 (2d Cir. 2005), which provides a cause of action
against the United States for copyright infringement. 28 U.S.C. § 1498(b) (2006). The
Smithsonian's self-identification, coupled with the Office of Legal Counsel's statement, implies
that the Smithsonian considers itself, at minimum, a part of the federal government. See
O'Rourke, 399 F.3d at 114; 12 Op. Off. Legal Counsel at 124-25.
59. 12 Op. Off. Legal Counsel at 123 (quoting Letter from Peter G. Powers, Gen. Counsel,
Smithsonian Inst., to Douglas W. Kmiec, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal
Counsel (Apr. 10, 1987)). Additionally, Chief Justice Taft, when serving as Chancellor of the
Board of Regents, supported the Smithsonian's own definition, asserting that "'[the Smithsonian]
is a private institution under the guardianship of the Government,"' thereby distinguishing it from
any particular branch of government. Id.
60. OFFICE OF THE FED. REGISTER, NAT'L ARCHIVES & RECORDS ADMIN., THE UNITED
STATES GOV'T MANUAL 2008/2009 559 (2008).
61. Id. at 559, 575-76 (listing the Legal Services Corporation, the State Justice Institute, and
the United States Institute of Peace as the other entities within this category).
62. Id. at 559 (explaining that the entities known as quasi-official agencies are "not
executive agencies under the definition in 5 U.S.C. [§] 105 but . . . are required by statute to
publish certain information on their programs and activities in the Federal Register"). Moreover,
John P. Elwood, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, argued that "[t]he
history of the Smithsonian suggests that Congress created the entity outside the Executive
Branch," the most significant events being Smithson's bequest and the Institution's subsequent
codification. Memorandum Opinion from John P. Elwood, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen.,
Office of Legal Counsel on the Office of Gov't Ethics Jurisdiction over the Smithsonian Inst., to
the Dir. of the Office of Gov't Ethics 5 (Feb. 29, 2008). Elwood argued that this legislative
action and the Institution's governing structure, to which the President appoints none of the
[Vol. 59:11391146
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In addition to this self-denotation and government classification, the District
of Columbia Circuit attempted to address the Smithsonian's identity within the
context of the Privacy Act.63 In Dong v. Smithsonian Institution, an employee
brought suit under the Privacy Act against the Smithsonian for failing to
contact her when investigating her alleged misconduct.64 The employee
complained that the Smithsonian's conduct violated the Privacy Act because
the Act "requires federal agencies, when gathering information that may lead
to an adverse determination about an individual, to obtain that information
directly from the individual."
65
The Smithsonian's primary defense to the allegation was that it was not an
"agency" to which the Privacy Act applied.66 In analyzing this argument, the
District of Columbia Circuit agreed with the Smithsonian, specifically noting
that "[i]t is plain that the Smithsonian is not an establishment in the executive
branch, 67 and, therefore, is not an entity covered by the Act's definition of
"agency. ' 68
In so concluding,69 the court reasoned that the Smithsonian must be
considered an "establishment in the executive branch" or a "Government
controlled corporation" to qualify as an independent establishment. 7' In
assessing the former, the court analyzed the governance of the Institution,
noting that "nine of the seventeen members of [the] governing Board of
seventeen Board members, is strong evidence that the Smithsonian exists outside of the executive
branch. Id.
63. See Dong v. Smithsonian Inst., 125 F.3d 877, 878-79 (D.C. Cir. 1997); see also 5
U.S.C. § 552(f)(1) (2006).
64. See Dong, 125 F.3d at 877-78. In Dong, an employee of the Joseph H. Hirshhom
Museum and Sculpture Garden, an entity of the Smithsonian, defied museum policy and
accompanied a painting to the Museum of Modem Art in New York without the requisite
approval. Id. at 877; see also 20 U.S.C. § 76bb(a) (2006) (establishing the Joseph H. Hirshhom
Museum and Sculpture Garden as part of the Smithsonian). The Smithsonian initiated its
investigation by contacting the New York museum directly, neglecting to question the employee
first. Dong, 125 F.3d at 878. The museum confirmed the employee's trip and the receipt of the
painting, and the Smithsonian suspended the employee for five days. Id Because of the
suspension, the plaintiff sued the Smithsonian under the Privacy Act. Id.
65. Dong, 125 F.3d at 878 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(2)).
66. Id. The Privacy Act defines "agency" as "any executive department, military
department, Government corporation, Government controlled corporation, or other establishment
in the executive branch of the Government." 5 U.S.C. § 552(0.
67. Dong, 125 F.3d at 879.
68. Id.; see also 5 U.S.C. § 552(0. The court also rejected the argument that the
Smithsonian may be housed within one of the other categories included in the definition of
agency. Dong, 125 F.3d at 879 ("Of the categories listed in § 552(0, the only ones that might be
thought to cover the Smithsonian are 'establishment in the executive branch' and 'Government
controlled corporation."'). The court then rejected the Smithsonian's identity as a government-
controlled corporation. Id.; see supra note 36.
69. Dong, 125 F.3d at 879 (finding that the Smithsonian is not an agency as defined by the
Privacy Act); see supra note 66.
70. Dong, 125 F.3d at 879-80.
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Regents are appointed by joint resolution of Congress," and that the Secretary
of the Smithsonian does not answer to the President. 71  The court further
observed that if the Smithsonian possessed executive authority, it would
violate the constitutional principle of separation of powers.72 In finding that
the Smithsonian was not part of the executive branch, the court concluded that
it was not an agency subject to the Privacy Act.73  Accordingly, the
Smithsonian's investigatory action was within the bounds of the Privacy Act.
74
In 2004, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia
similarly decided in Dodge v. Trustees of the National Gallery of Art.75 Like
Dong, the Dodge court addressed a Privacy Act suit against an entity of the
Smithsonian, the National Gallery of Art.7  The plaintiff-employee received
one year of approved leave due to his son's medical condition 77 and, four
months into his leave, refused to work mandated overtime.78 The Smithsonian
requested the plaintiffs leave information to assess whether he was excused
from his overtime obligation. 79 After review, the Smithsonian concluded that
he was not excused and pursued disciplinary action. The plaintiff maintained
that the Institution's review of those records breached the confidentiality of his
son's medical documents and, therefore, violated the Privacy Act.
81
71. Id. at 879.
72. Id. Professor Linda Jellum defines "separation of powers" as "the allocation of power
and function among the branches of the government." Linda D. Jellum, "Which is to be Master, "
the Judiciary or the Legislature? When Statutory Directives Violate Separation of Powers, 56
UCLA L. REv. 837, 854 (2009). Separation of powers concerns the distinct role and authority
that each of the three branches executes "in creating, interpreting, and implementing law." Id.
The judicial branch wields power to hear, decide, and interpret cases and controversies, U.S.
CONST. art. III, § 2, the executive branch holds the power to execute laws, U.S. CONST. art. II, §
1, 2, and the legislative branch promulgates these laws, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. The Dong court
was concerned that having members of the judicial and legislative branches serving on the
governing board of an establishment in the executive branch would violate the separation of
powers doctrine. Dong, 125 F.3d at 879.
73. Dong, 125 F.3d at 883.
74. Id.
75. See Dodge v. Trs. of the Nat'l Gallery of Art, 326 F. Supp. 2d 1, 11 (D.D.C. 2004)
("The Smithsonian Museums ... are not subjected to the limitations of the Privacy Act because
they do not fall within the definition of an 'agency."').
76. Id. at 4 n.1; see 20 U.S.C. § 71 (2006) (appropriating a specified area in Washington,
D.C. "to the Smithsonian Institution as a site for a National Gallery of Art" and further
authorizing the Smithsonian to construct on that area "a building to be designated the National
Gallery of Art").
77. Dodge, 326 F. Supp. 2d at 4-5.
78. Id. at 5.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 5-6.
81. Id. at 4. The Privacy Act asserts that "[n]o agency shall disclose any record which is
contained in a system of records by any means of communication to any person, or to another
agency, except pursuant to a written request by, or with the prior written consent of, the
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Subsequently, the plaintiff wrote letters to two U.S. senators complaining of
the Smithsonian's action, an action that resulted in two senatorial inquiries.
82
Allegedly, the Smithsonian responded to this by posting a "Security Alert"
around the National Gallery listing the "plaintiffs photograph, age, height,
weight, date of birth, sex, race, complexion and Social Security number."
83
The plaintiff argued that this conduct was a retaliatory action that, too, violated
the Privacy Act.
84
In analyzing the viability of the suit, 85 the court considered the
Smithsonian's sovereign immunity, eventually finding that "the National
Gallery is a Smithsonian Museum and is therefore a government entity
86
immune from suit.87 It then explained that "[e]ven if the National Gallery were
not immune from suit, it is still not subject to the Privacy Act" because, given
case law and the Institution's structure, the Smithsonian is not an "agency" for
purposes of the Act.88  The court excluded the Smithsonian from those
categories of entities considered "agenc[ies]" under the Act, including "other
individual to whom the record pertains." 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b) (2006). The plaintiff claimed that
supplying confidential medical records violated this provision. Dodge, 326 F. Supp. 2d at 4.
82. Dodge, 326 F. Supp. 2d at 6. He also sent letters to seven United States congressmen.
Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 4, 6.
85. The plaintiff and the National Gallery of Art settled the dispute while the suit was
pending on appeal before the Merit Systems Protection Board. Id. at 8. The terms of the
settlement provided for the plaintiff's reinstatement to his position for four months, after which he
would submit a letter of resignation. Id. Under the agreement, the plaintiff also waived his right
to judicial relief, stating, in part, "This Agreement resolves all matters arising from Appellant's
removal from the Gallery; including his Merit Systems Protection Board ... appeal ... and any
and all claims of any nature which Appellant raised or could raise in any forum." Id. The
plaintiff cooperated with the terms of the agreement by filing his resignation. Id. He then,
however, initiated an action against five individual defendants, not including the National Gallery
of Art. Id. The Dodge decision addresses the latter suit against these individuals. Id. at 4 n. 1.
86. Id. at 11. In finding that the National Gallery of Art was a Smithsonian Museum and
thus a government entity, the Dodge court considered its means of establishment, noting that
"Congress established the National Gallery under the auspices of the Smithsonian Institution."
Id. at 10 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 72 (2006)). Once the court established that the National Gallery was
a Smithsonian Museum, it cited authority that defined the Smithsonian as a government entity,
observing that the "D.C. Circuit has specifically found that the Smithsonian Museums qualify as
government entities." Id. at 11 (citing Expeditions Unlimited Aquatic Enters., Inc. v.
Smithsonian Inst., 566 F.2d 289, 296 (D.C. Cir. 1977)). Therefore, the court transivitely reasoned
that the National Gallery of Art was immune from suit because it qualified as a Smithsonian
Museum, which enjoyed sovereign immunity as a government entity. Id. at 10-11.
87. Id. at 11 ("The National Gallery is not subject to suits to which it has not explicitly
consented. Since the government has not waived sovereign immunity with regard to the Privacy
Act as it applies to the National Gallery, the plaintiffs claim against the National Gallery cannot
stand.").
88. Id. at 11-12 (citing Dong v. Smithsonian Inst., 125 F.3d 877, 878-79 (D.C. Cir. 1997)).
1149
Catholic University Law Review
establishment[s] in the executive branch of the Government." 89 As such, the
court implicitly found that the Smithsonian was not an establishment in the
executive branch. 90
D. Other Authorities Have Found that the Smithsonian Is an Executive Agency
In 1977, the District of Columbia Circuit was confronted with the same issue
under a different statute and focused on the Smithsonian's immunity from suit
for purposes of the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). 91  In Expeditions
Unlimited Aquatic Enterprises, Inc. v. Smithsonian Institution, the court
addressed a libel action against the Smithsonian, ultimately finding that the
Smithsonian enjoyed government immunity in libel suits under the FTCA.
92
In extending immunity to the Smithsonian, the court addressed the threshold
question of whether the Smithsonian was a federal agency for purposes of the
FTCA. 93  Under the FTCA, a federal agency is an "independent
establishment[] of the United States." 94  In concluding that the Smithsonian
was a federal agency within this definition, the court noted that, despite the
Institution's "private dimension, . . . the nature of its function as a national
museum and center of scholarship, coupled with the substantial governmental
89. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(1) (2006) (adopting the definition of"agency" set forth in 5 U.S.C. §
552(f)). The other entities that are agencies under the Privacy Act are "executive department[s],
military department[s], Government corporation[s], Government controlled corporation[s] ...
[and] any independent regulatory agenc[ies]." Id. (adopting the definition of agency from §
552(f)).
90. See Dodge, 326 F. Supp. 2d. at 11-12.
91. See Expeditions Unlimited Aquatic Enters., Inc., 566 F.2d at 296. A relevant provision
of the FTCA explains that the district courts have jurisdiction over "civil actions on claims
against the United States, for money damages ... for ... [a] wrongful act or omission of any
employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under
circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant." 28
U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (2006). The FTCA specifies that actions against the federal government are
subject to provisions in Chapter 171, which contain notable definitions and exceptions. Id; see
also 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (outlining the claims to which the FTCA does not apply).
92. Expeditions Unlimited Aquatic Enters., Inc., 566 F.2d at 291 (granting "summary
judgment for defendant Smithsonian Institution on governmental immunity grounds"). A suit
also was brought against the Chairman of the Department of Anthropology at the Smithsonian's
Museum of Natural History. Id In granting summary judgment for the Smithsonian on
sovereign immunity grounds, the District of Columbia Circuit thoroughly interpreted the FTCA
and concluded that it permitted immunity in libel suits. Id at 299. It held that the exception
clause contained in the FTCA should "be read as defining the existence of immunity in suits
involving deliberate torts." Id. The exception clause specifically provides that Chapter 171 and
28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) do not apply to libel claims. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h).
93. Expeditions Unlimited Aquatic Enters., Inc., 566 F.2d at 296 (explaining that the first
step in the court's analysis is to decide whether the Smithsonian is a federal agency for purposes
of the FTCA).
94. 28 U.S.C. § 2671. The Act's definition of "agency" also "includes the executive
departments, the judicial and legislative branches, the military departments .... and corporations
primarily acting as instrumentalities or agencies of the United States." Id.
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role in funding and oversight, make the institution an 'independent
establishment of the United States,' within the 'federal agency' definition."
95
Similarly, the Department of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel (OLC),
responding to a question concerning the status of the Smithsonian under the
96Federal Property and Administrative Services Act (Property Act), determined
that the Smithsonian was an executive agency subject to the Act.98  In
reaching this conclusion, OLC first noted the absence of explicit applicability
and pertinent legislative history. 99  Because the Smithsonian's power to
conduct property transactions was repealed and delegated to executive
agencies generally, OLC reasoned that Congress likely 00considered the
Smithsonian an executive agency subject to the Property Act. 0
In 1992, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, in
Cotton v. Adams, found the Smithsonian subject to yet another statute, the
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 1°' from which the Privacy Act takes its
definition of "agency."' 1 2 In Cotton, the plaintiff filed a FOIA request seeking
reports from the Smithsonian's Office of Inspector General that pertained to
two employees of the Smithsonian's Museum Shops.' 0 3  In response, the
Smithsonian released two of the four documents sought, claiming that the
withheld documents were exempt from disclosure.'0 4 Before discussing the
alleged exemption, the Cotton court denied the Smithsonian's contention that it
was not subject to FOIA, 1 5 and found instead that, given FOIA's definition of
95. Expeditions UnlimitedAquatic Enters. Inc., 566 F.2d at 296.
96. The purpose of the Property Act is to "facilitate the procurement of property and
services." 41 U.S.C. § 251 (2006). The Act, among other things, lists provisions with which
executive agencies must comply when purchasing or contracting for property. Id. § 252.
97. 40 U.S.C. § 102 (2006) (defining executive agency for purposes of the Property Act as
an "independent establishment in the executive branch of the Government").
98. 12 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 122, 127 (1988).
99. Id. at 125 ("Congress did not expressly specify the status of the Smithsonian under the
Property Act. Nor does the legislative history of the Property Act elaborate on the definitions of
,executive agency' and 'Federal agency' contained in the Act."); see H.R. REP. No. 670, at 8
(1949), reprinted in 1949 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1475, 1481-82 (failing to define executive agency and
federal agency).
100. 12 Op. Off. Legal Counsel at 126-27.
101. Cotton v. Adams, 798 F. Supp. 22, 24 (D.D.C. 1992); see also 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006).
102. See infra notes 146-49 and accompanying text.
103. Cotton, 798 F. Supp. at 23.
104. Id. at 24. The Cotton court explained that the Smithsonian withheld the documents
pursuant to two exemptions provided in FOIA. Id. The specific exemptions protected documents
containing "personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute
a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy," 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6), and those the
disclosure of which "could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy," id. § 552(b)(7)(C).
105. Cotton, 798 F. Supp. at 24.
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"agency,"'' 0 6 the "Smithsonian's structure revealted] its status as an authority
of the government properly subject to the FOIA." "
Additionally, the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB), 10 8 in Pessa v.
Smithsonian Institution, addressed a whistle-blower retaliation action and
determined that the Smithsonian was an independent establishment for
purposes of 5 U.S.C. § 2302, which details prohibited personnel practices.
0 9
The case focused on the MSPB's jurisdiction over an appeal in which the
appellant argued that the Smithsonian had rendered an unfair performance
rating in retaliation of her protected whistle-blowing. 10 After finding that
issuing a performance rating constituted a "personnel action,""' the court
turned to the secondary issue of whether the employee worked for an agency
subject to 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(c). 1 2  The statute defines agency as "an
Executive agency and the Government Printing Office."" 3 As an independent
establishment, I the Board reasoned that the Smithsonian was an executive
agency for purposes of 5 U.S.C. § 105, and therefore an executive agency
under § 2302(a)(2)(C). 115 Accordingly, the court held that the statute applied
to the Smithsonian and that the suit was proper.l6
106. FOIA defines "agency" to "include[] any executive department, military department,
Government corporation, Government controlled corporation, or other establishment in the
executive branch of the Government (including the Executive Office of the President), or any
independent regulatory agency." 5 U.S.C. § 552(0.
107. Cotton, 798 F. Supp. at 24.
108. See infra note 170.
109. Pessa v. Smithsonian Inst., 60 M.S.P.R. 421, 425 (1994); see also 5 U.S.C. § 2302.
110. Pessa, 60 M.S.P.R. at 423.
Ill. Id. at 425. The statute defines "personnel action" as including, among other things, "(i)
an appointment; (ii) a promotion; ... (iv) a detail, transfer or reassignment; (v) a reinstatement;
(vi) a restoration; (vii) a reemployment; [and] (viii) a performance evaluation under chapter 43 of
this title." 5 U.S.C § 2302(a)(2)(A). Chapter 43 discusses the details of performance appraisal
systems, providing that "[e]ach agency shall develop one or more performance appraisal systems
which ...provide for periodic appraisals of job performance of employees." 5 U.S.C §
4302(a)(1).
112. Pessa, 60 M.S.P.R. at 425.
113. 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(C).
114. Pessa, 60 M.S.P.R. at 425 ("The Smithsonian Institution is an 'independent
establishment."' (internal citation omitted)). In finding that the Smithsonian was an independent
establishment, the Pessa court cited the Smithsonian's charter at 20 U.S.C. § 41, which states that
the Smithsonian is an "establishment," and a 1907 Attorney General Opinion that asserts that the
Smithsonian is "independent of any of the Executive Departments." Id, (6iting 20 U.S.C. § 41
(2006); 26 Op. Att'y Gen. 209, 214 (1907)).
115. Pessa, 60 M.S.P.R. at 425; see 5 U.S.C. §§ 105, 2302(a)(2)(C).
116. Pessa, 60 M.S.P.R. at 425.
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E. The Workforce Investment Act and that the Smithsonian Employs Persons
Holding Positions in the Competitive Service May Carry Implications for the
Smithsonian's Identity
In addition to case law, the Workforce Investment Act and that the
Smithsonian employs persons holding positions in the competitive service
speak to its identity for purposes of Title 5.
In 1998, Congress passed the Workforce Investment Act, 1 7 which stripped
the Smithsonian of the sovereign immunity that it enjoyed under certain
statutes. 118 In so doing, Congress added the Smithsonian to lists of entities to
which each statute applied, distinguishing it from executive agencies.
119
Furthermore, the Institution employs persons holding positions in the
competitive service. 120  By definition, the competitive service includes "all
civil service positions in the executive branch."12  The only exception to this
is statutory specification that certain employees outside of the executive branch
are part of the competitive service. 122  Because no such statute exists with
regard to the Smithsonian, Smithsonian employees within the competitive
service, by definition, hold positions in the executive branch. 123 It is certainly
significant that Smithsonian employees, by virtue of their employment with the
Smithsonian, are considered part of the executive branch.
117. Workforce Investment Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-220, § 341, 112 Stat. 936, 1092
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C., 29 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.).
118. See id. (waiving the Smithsonian's sovereign immunity under the Civil Rights Act of
1964, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and
the labor management laws codified at 5 U.S.C. § 7103(a)(3)).
119. See id. For example, the Act states that "[s]ection 15(a) of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967 (29 U.S.C. 633a(a)) is amended by inserting 'in the Smithsonian
Institution,' before 'and in the Government Printing Office."' Id. As a result, that statute now
reads:
All personnel actions affecting employees or applicants for employment who are at
least 40 years of age (except personnel actions with regard to aliens employed outside
the limits of the United States) in military departments as defined in section 102 of title
5, in executive agencies as defined in section 105 of title 5 (including employees and
applicants for employment who are paid from nonappropriated funds), in the United
States Postal Service and the Postal Regulatory Commission, in those units in the
government of the District of Columbia having positions in the competitive service, and
in those units of the judicial branch of the Federal Government having positions in the
competitive service, in the Smithsonian Institution, and in the Government Printing
Office, the Government Accountability Office, and the Library of Congress shall be
made free from any discrimination based on age.
29 U.S.C. § 633a(a) (2006) (emphasis added).
120. See Telephone Interview with Tom Lawrence, Human Res., Smithsonian Inst. (Jan. 19,
2010) (explaining that approximately two-thirds of the Smithsonian's six thousand employees
hold position within the competitive service).
121. 5 U.S.C. § 2102(a)(1) (2006) (emphasis added).
122. Id. § 2102(b).
123. See id. § 2102(a)(1). This may be significant because an independent establishment is
"an establishment in the executive branch." Id. § 104 (emphasis added).
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11. THE SMITHSONIAN IS AN EXECUTIVE AGENCY UNDER 5 U.S.C. § 105
Although some authority suggests the Smithsonian is not an executive
agency, 12 a close examination of the Institution, along with other persuasive
evidence, demonstrates that the Smithsonian is, indeed, an independent
establishment and, therefore, an executive agency under 5 U.S.C. § 105.125
A. The Workforce Investment Act of 1998 Does Not Indicate that the
Smithsonian Is Not an Executive Agency
1 26
Statutory interpretation paralleling the Haddon court's rationale may
uncover the effect that the Workforce Investment Act of 1998 has on the
Smithsonian's identity. 27 With this Act, Congress distinguished the Institution
from "executive agencies."' 28 The Haddon court stated that because Congress
"used the term 'independent establishment' in distinction to the Executive
Residence," it did not consider the Residence an independent establishment.
29
Likewise, Congress's affirmative act of passing the Workforce Investment Act
and subjecting the Smithsonian to specific statutes, but distinguishing it from
executive agencies, 30 may suggest that Congress did not consider the
Smithsonian an executive agency.
Judicial interpretation, however, and not congressional initiative, prompted
at least portions of the amendment to the Workforce Investment Act.' 3' For
example, the fact that courts' interpretations had not previously found the
124. See supra Part I.B-C (examining authority that concluded that the Smithsonian is not an
independent establishment and thus not an executive agency).
125. See infra Part 11.
126. Many thanks to Kristin Ellis, Esq., for suggesting this argument. Her thoughts and
analysis about the Workforce Investment Act and its impact, as well as her additional research on
the Smithsonian, contributed significantly to this Comment.
127. See Haddon v. Waiters, 43 F.3d 1488, 1490 (D.C. Cir. 1995); see also supra notes
117-18 and accompanying text.
128. See Workforce Investment Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-220, § 341, 112 Stat. 936, 1092
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C., 29 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.).
129. Haddon, 43 F.3d at 1490 ("That Congress distinguished the Executive Residence from
the independent establishments ...suggests that Congress does not regard the Executive
Residence to be an independent establishment ....").
130. Workforce Investment Act of 1998 § 341, 112 Stat. at 1092; see, e.g., 5 U.S.C.
§ 7103(a)(3) (2006) ("'[Aigency' means an Executive agency, . . . the Library of Congress, the
Government Printing Office, and the Smithsonian Institution."); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a) (2006)
(applying the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to the Smithsonian as well as to executive agencies
defined under 5 U.S.C. § 105).
131. See O'Rourke v. Smithsonian Inst. Press, 399 F.3d 113, 121 (2d Cir. 2005) (explaining
that strict construal of sovereign immunity waivers necessitated the Workforce Investment Act).
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Smithsonian covered by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a) 132 or 29 U.S.C. § 633a(a) 13 3
reflects judicial consideration of a longstanding concept of sovereign
immunity, that "waivers of sovereign immunity are to be construed strictly and
narrowly in favor of the sovereign." 134  In accord with this principle, the
Supreme Court has held that "[a] waiver of the Federal Government's
sovereign immunity must be unequivocally expressed in statutory text."
135
In the absence of congressional waiver, the Smithsonian enjoys sovereign
immunity. 136  With the Workforce Investment Act, however, Congress
explicitly and textually 137 waived the Smithsonian's sovereign immunity under
certain statutes. 138  Unlike Haddon, that Congress distinguished the
Smithsonian from executive agencies does not mean that it rejected the
Smithsonian's identity as an executive agency for purposes of Title 5.139
Rather, this distinction only indicates that Congress was reacting negatively to
judicial interpretations of sovereign immunity and desired that the Smithsonian
be amenable to suit and subject to the payment of damages for violating certain
statutes. 14  Thus, Congress's separation of the Smithsonian from executiveagencies in select statutes is not determinative.
132. This statute "provide[s] procedures to protect the rights of certain government
employees, with respect to their public employment, to be free of discrimination on the basis of
race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, or disability." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16a(b) (2006).
133. This statute prohibits age discrimination in employment for designated federal agencies.
29 U.S.C. § 633a(a) (2006).
134. O'Rourke, 399 F.3d at 121 (citing Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 195 (1996)).
135. Lane, 518 U.S. at 192. The Court in Lane found that Congress did not waive the
sovereign immunity of the United States Government for purposes of § 504(a) of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Id. at 200.
136. Misra v. Smithsonian Astrophysical Observatory, 248 F.3d 37, 39 (1st Cir. 2001) ("The
Smithsonian is a federal agency which enjoys sovereign immunity from suit.").
137. Congress thus satisfied the requirements of Lane for waiver of sovereign immunity. See
supra note 135.
138. Workforce Investment Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-220, § 341, 112 Stat. 936, 1092
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C., 29 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.) (requiring the
Smithsonian to comply with certain statutes, and therefore subjecting it to liability for violating
those provisions).
139. See O'Rourke, 399 F.3d at 121 (noting that Congress's exclusion of the Smithsonian
from various statutes "does not reflect an affirmative conclusion by the courts that Congress
meant not to include [the Smithsonian]" within the definition of executive agency). Significantly,
Congress included the Smithsonian within applicable entities in the labor management laws of
Title 5. Workforce Investment Act of 1998 § 341, 112 Stat. at 1092; see 5 U.S.C. § 7103(a)(3)
(2006).
140. See O'Rourke, 399 F.3d at 121 ("[T]he Smithsonian became amenable to suit under
employment discrimination laws such as Title VII and the Rehabilitation Act by virtue of the
passage of the Workforce Investment Act of 1998."); Misra, 248 F.3d at 39 (observing that the
ambiguity of whether the Smithsonian enjoyed sovereign immunity "was resolved when Congress
passed the Workforce Investment Act of 1998 ... [because] Congress explicitly waived the
Smithsonian's sovereign immunity with respect to Title VII claims").
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B. The Smithsonian Is an Executive Agency
Despite the Smithsonian's self-identification,' the Dong and Dodge courts'
interpretation of the Institution under the Privacy Act, 42 and the weak
suggestion of the Workforce Investment Act, 143 considerable authority and
evidence rightly suggest that the Smithsonian is an executive agency for
purposes of Title 5.
1. Judicial Interpretation of the Freedom of Information Act Supports
Defining the Smithsonian as an Executive Agency
In 1992, five years before the District of Columbia Circuit decided Dong,
the United States District Court for the District of Columbia analyzed the
application of FOIA 144 to the Smithsonian. 145 Notably, the Privacy Act, at
issue in Dong and Dodge, derives its definition of "agency" from FOIA.
146
The Dong and Dodge courts found that the Smithsonian is not an agency under
this definition; 14 7 the D.C. District Court, in Cotton v. Adams, held the
opposite.
148
Although Cotton was impliedly overruled because the subsequent District of
Columbia Circuit decision declined to define the Smithsonian as an executive
agency under the same definition, the district court arguably was correct in its
findings. In assessing whether the Smithsonian was an executive agency under
FOIA, the Cotton court observed that "Congress amended the definition of
'agency' in § 552(f) of the FOIA in order to 'include those entities which may
not be considered agencies under [the Administrative Procedure Act], but
which perform governmental functions and control information of interest to
the public.""149 Assessing the Smithsonian with this in mind, the district court
141. See supra Part I.C.
142. See supra Part I.C.
143. See supra Part I.E.
144. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006). FOIA outlines the documents and information agencies must
disclose upon request. See id.
145. Cotton v. Adams, 798 F. Supp. 22, 24 (D.D.C. 1992).
146. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(1) ("[T]he term 'agency' means agency as defined in section 552[(t)]
of this title.").
147. See Dong v. Smithsonian Inst., 125 F.3d 877, 879-80 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Dodge v. Trs. of
the Nat'l Gallery of Art, 326 F. Supp. 2d 1, 11-12 (D.D.C. 2004).
148. See Cotton, 798 F. Supp. at 24 ("[T]he Smithsonian's structure reveals its status as an
authority of the government properly subject to the FOIA.").
149. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 93-876, at 8 (1974)). The House Report quoted in Cotton
explains that the expansion of FOIA was "to insure inclusion under the Act of Government
corporations, Government controlled corporations, or other establishments within the executive
branch." H.R. REP. No. 93-876, at 8 (emphasis added). The Administrative Procedure Act
(APA) defines agency as "each authority of the Government of the United States, whether or not
it is within or subject to review by another agency" and lists a series of excluded entities. 5
U.S.C. § 55 1(1). Regarding the APA's definition of agency, OLC has commented that "'[t]he
Smithsonian performs none of the purely operational functions of government which have been
given such significant weight in determinations of agency status in other cases."' 12 Op. Off.
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held that "[t]he Smithsonian is subject to the FOIA because it performs
governmental functions as a center of scholarship and national museum
responsible for the safekeeping and maintenance of national treasures."
150
Additionally, the court pointed to characteristics of the Smithsonian that
identify it as an agency subject to FOIA, namely
that the Smithsonian receives federal funds for many of its
operations, that it is chartered by an Act of Congress, and that it has a
majority of civil service employees . . . [and] that it receives
representation from the United States Attorney, absolute
governmental immunity in libel suits, and other benefits in property
transfers. 151
In holding that the Smithsonian is subject to the provisions of FOIA, 152 the
Cotton court impliedly acknowledged that the Institution is an "agency" for
purposes of that Act.153 As an agency subject to FOIA, the Smithsonian must
be an "establishment in the executive branch of the Government" because it
does not fit within the other categories of entities considered agencies under
FOIA's definition.
154
Legal Counsel 122, 124 (1988) (quoting Memorandum from Leon Ulman, Deputy Assistant
Attorney Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to Peter Powers, Gen. Counsel, the Smithsonian Inst. 10
(Feb. 19, 1976)). As a result, the Smithsonian is not encompassed by the APA's definition of
agency, a determination that the Cotton court implies. See Cotton, 798 F. Supp. at 24.
150. Cotton, 798 F. Supp. at 24.
151. Id.
152. Id ("The Smithsonian is subject to the FOIA because it performs governmental
functions as a center of scholarship and national museum responsible for the safekeeping and
maintenance of national treasures.").
153. See 5 U.S.C. §552(f)(1) (2006) ("'[A]gency' as defined in section 551(1) of this title
includes any executive department, military department, Government corporation, Government
controlled corporation, or other establishment in the executive branch of the Government
(including the Executive Office of the President), or any independent regulatory agency ....").
154. Id. The other categories are "any executive department, military department,
Government corporation, Government controlled corporation,... or any independent regulatory
agency." Id. The Smithsonian is not an executive department, military department, Government
corporation, or Government controlled corporation. See supra note 36. An independent
regulatory agency is defined as "[a] federal agency, commission, or board that is not under the
direction of the executive, such as the Federal Trade Commission or the National Labor Relations
Board." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 71-72 (9th ed. 2009). Although the details of an
independent regulatory agency are outside the scope of this Comment, one may assume that the
Smithsonian is not an independent regulatory agency similar to the Federal Trade Commission
because it is not empowered to, among other things, promulgate rules. Cf 16 C.F.R. § 1.8 (2009)
("[T]he [Federal Trade] Commission is empowered to promulgate trade regulation rules.").
Because the Smithsonian lacks the power to promulgate rules and is not one of the other
qualifying entities, the Cotton court likely interpreted the Smithsonian to be an "agency" by virtue
of being an "other establishment in the executive branch." See Cotton, 798 F. Supp. at 24; see
also 5 U.S.C. § 552(0(1).
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2. Judicial Interpretation of the Federal Tort Claims Act Supports Defining
the Smithsonian as an Independent Establishment
Analyzing the Smithsonian under decisions interpreting the Privacy Act and
FOIA and applying that to the definition in 5 U.S.C. § 105 presents a glaring
issue. Although the Privacy Act and FOIA are housed within Title 5, they
contain internal definitions of "agency" and do not reference or otherwise
employ the general definition of "agency" provided in Title 5.155 Therefore,
although persuasive, the Dong and Dodge decisions are not necessarily
dispositive.
Nevertheless, the Dodge court, in holding that the Smithsonian is not an
executive agency, made a significant observation that suggests the opposite
conclusion. 56 The court cited the findings of the District of Columbia Circuit
in Expeditions Unlimited Aquatic Enterprises v. Smithsonian Institution, which
concluded that "the nature of [the Smithsonian's] function as a national
museum and center of scholarship, coupled with the substantial govemmental
role in funding and oversight, make the institution an 'independent
establishment of the United States,' within the 'federal agency' definition" of
the FTCA.'57 Similarly, the Dong court observed that the Smithsonian's
characteristics, including its federal charter, employment of federal civil-
service employees, and federal immunity from taxes and libel actions, justify
its being classified as an independent establishment subject to the FTCA.158
Significantly, the FTCA includes in its definition of federal agency,
"independent establishments of the United States. ''i 59 Neither the Act nor Title
28, however, defines independent establishment,' and unlike the Privacy Act
and FOIA, the FTCA is part of Title 28, not Title 5 .161 However, one may
155. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 105, 552, 552(a). The internal definitions in these statutes do not
incorporate the Title 5 definition of "agency." Cf 49 U.S.C. § 32917(a) (2006) ("'[E]xecutive
agency' has the same meaning given that term in section 105 of title 5." (emphasis added)).
156. See Dodge v. Trs. of the Nat'l Gallery of Art, 326 F. Supp. 2d 1, 11 (D.D.C. 2004).
157. Id. (quoting Expeditions Unlimited Aquatic Enters., Inc. v. Smithsonian Inst., 566 F.2d
289, 296 (D.C. Cir. 1977)); see 28 U.S.C. § 2671 (2006) ("[Tlhe term 'Federal agency' includes
the executive departments, the judicial and legislative branches, the military departments,
independent establishments of the United States, and corporations primarily acting as
instrumentalities or agencies of the United States, but does not include any contractor with the
United States.").
158. Dong v. Smithsonian Inst., 125 F.3d 877, 880 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (citing Expeditions
Unlimited Aquatic Enters., Inc., 566 F.2d at 296). The Dong court acknowledged that these
characteristics "justiflied] classifying the Smithsonian as an 'independent establishment of the
United States' for purposes of the [FTCA]." Id.
159. 28U.S.C.§2671.
160. See id.; see also Scott v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Kan. City, 406 F.3d 532, 535 (8th Cir.
2005) ("[T]he term 'independent establishment' is not defined within Title 28.").
161. See 28 U.S.C. § 2671. In recognizing the Smithsonian as an executive agency under the
FTCA, the Dong court noted that the FTCA "[defines] 'Federal agency' broadly to include
'independent establishments of the United States,"' but also distinguished the definition of
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infer that the term independent establishment means "an independent entity
within the executive branch from other parts of the United States Code,"
namely 5 U.S.C. § 104.162 Therefore, because the Smithsonian is an
independent establishment for purposes of the FTCA, 63 it likely is anindependent establishment for purposes of Title 5.
3. Analysis of the Property Act and Decisions by the Merit Systems
Protection Board Support Defining the Smithsonian as an Executive Agency
In 1988, OLC determined that the Smithsonian was an independent
establishment for purposes of the Property Act,' 64 a Title 41 provision.' 65 In so
finding, OLC considered the internal definition of "agency" provided by the
Act: "The term 'executive agency' means . . . an executive department or
independent establishment in the executive branch of the Government . ... 166
After noting that the legislative history shed no light on the definition of
"agency" and that the Smithsonian was not explicitly defined elsewhere, OLC
turned to congressional action. 167  It reasoned that "the best evidence the
Smithsonian is an 'executive agency' is that the Property Act repealed the
Smithsonian's prior statutory authority for certain property exchanges and
replaced it with a provision applicable only to executive agencies., Thus,
OLC concluded that Congress viewed the Smithsonian as an executive agency
for purposes of the Property Act.169
In addition to OLC's opinion and the analyses of the D.C. Circuit and
district courts, the MSPB 17 also determined that the Smithsonian was an
"agency" under the Privacy Act, borrowed from FOIA, which defines "agency" more narrowly.
Dong, 125 F.3d at 883 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2671).
162. Scott, 406 F.3d at 535 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 104, which defines independent establishment);
see also Jones v. United States, 17 Cl. Ct. 78, 82 (1989) (explaining that "[t]he term 'executive
department' is not defined within Title 28, but section 451 defines 'department' by reference to
the definition in Title 5 of the Code").
163. See Expeditions Unlimited Aquatic Enters., Inc., 566 F.2d at 296.
164. 12 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 122, 122 (1988).
165. 41 U.S.C. §§ 251-254b (2006). Because this is a Title 41 provision, definitions
provided by Title 5 are not immediately applicable.
166. 40 U.S.C. § 102(4)(A) (2006) (emphasis added); see 12 Op. Off. Legal Counsel at 124-
25.
167. 12 Op. Off. Legal Counsel at 125.
168. Id. at 126.
169. Id. at 127. Although the opinion makes clear that its determination is limited to the
Property Act, the fact that Congress considered the Smithsonian an executive agency for this
statute is relevant to the question at issue. See id. at 124. Moreover, President Harry S. Truman
considered the Smithsonian an executive agency, which is evidenced by the fact that he included
the Smithsonian as an addressee of a letter regarding the Property Act which was sent to all
executive agencies. Id. at 127 n.6.
170. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.1 (2009) ("The [MSPB] has two types of jurisdiction, original and
appellate."). Under its original jurisdiction, the MSPB hears cases about prohibited personnel
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independent establishment for purposes of Title 5.171 In analyzing the
Institution under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(C), which defines an "agency" as "an
Executive agency and the Government Printing Office,"' 72 the MSPB found
that "[t]he Smithsonian Institution is an 'independent establishment,"' and
therefore an executive agency subject to the statute. 173  In reaching this
conclusion, the Board referenced the Institution's charter, observing that it
identifies the Smithsonian as an "establishment." 174 It also considered a 1907
Attorney General Opinion that found the Institution "independent of any of the
Executive Departments."'1 75 Given this evidence, the MSPB determined that
the Smithsonian is an independent establishment and, thus, subject to the
statute. 176
4. The Fact that the Smithsonian Employs Persons Holding Positions in the
Competitive Service Indicates the Institution Is Executive in Nature
Perhaps the most significant factor weighing in favor of the Smithsonian's
executive nature is the fact that it employs individuals holding positions in the
competitive service. 17 7  The Smithsonian's workforce "consists of 5,950
federal and non-federal employees, and over 5,000 volunteers,' 78 creating two
distinct classes-federal civil-service employees and trust-fund employees.
1 79
The former are "paid from funds appropriated by the Congress directly to the
Institution"; the latter, trust-fund employees, are "paid from trust funds and
appointed under the provisions of trust fund personnel policies. ' 18° Trust-fund
practices and political activity, persons removed from the Senior Executive Service due to poor
performance, and penalties against administrative law judges. Id. § 1201.2(a)-(c).
171. Pessa v. Smithsonian Inst., 60 M.S.P.R. 421, 425 (1994).
172. 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(C) (2006) (excluding various entities from the definition of
"agency," but including government corporations that engage in prohibited personnel practices).
173. Pessa, 60 M.S.P.R. at 425; see Seigla v. Smithsonian Inst., 62 M.S.P.R. 55, 57 n.1
(1994) (reiterating that, in Pessa, "the Board found that the Smithsonian was an 'agency' under 5
U.S.C. § 105").
174. Pessa, 60 M.S.P.R. at 425 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 41 (2006)).
175. Id. (quoting 26 Op. Att'y Gen. 209, 214 (1907)).
176. Id.
177. Telephone Interview with Tom Lawrence, Human Res., Smithsonian Inst. (Jan. 19,
2010).
178. MANAGEMENT'S DiscussION, supra note 3, at 3.
179. See Smithsonian Inst., Career Center, How to Apply, http://www.sihr.si.edu/howto
apply.html (last visited Aug. 18, 2010) ("The Smithsonian employs individuals in Federal Civil
Service and non-Federal (Trust) positions."); see also Misra v. Smithsonian Astrophysical
Observatory, 248 F.3d 37, 38 (1st Cir. 2001) ("Smithsonian employees are paid from one of two
sources: federal funds or funds controlled by the Smithsonian Trust, a private entity."); Bisson v.
Office of Pers. Mgmt., 908 F.2d 947, 950 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (noting that the Smithsonian
distinguished between the private-roll and the federal-roll employees).
180. Wolcott v. United States, 43 Fed. Cl. 581, 582 (1999) (internal quotation omitted). In
Fiscal Year 2007, sixty-two percent of the Smithsonian's budget came from federal
appropriations. FY 2007 BUDGET SOURCES, supra note 7. The remainder of its budget consisted
of trust funds, which are "monies administered by the Smithsonian Institution other than those
1160
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employees and civil-service employees are mutually exclusive classes.
1 81
"Most federal civil service employees are employed by way of either the
'competitive service' or the 'excepted service."" 82  By definition, the
competitive service includes "all civil service positions in the executive
branch," with limited exceptions.' 83  Additionally, the competitive service
consists of "civil service positions not in the executive branch which are
specifically included in the competitive service by statute.'' 184  Because no
statute classifies civil-service positions at the Smithsonian in the competitive
service, those Smithsonian employees holding positions within the competitive
service must be part of the executive branch. Therefore, the Smithsonian
employs personnel who are within the executive branch, by virtue of their
employment with the Institution. This suggests that the Smithsonian, as a
whole, likely falls within the executive branch.
5. The Smithsonian 's Codification and the Constitutional Appointment
Power Suggest that the Smithsonian Is Executive in Nature
Aside from recent interpretation and the nature of the Smithsonian's current
operation, the origins of the Institution suggest that it is executive in nature,
despite the alternative argument. 186  Before its codification, Congress passed
an Act on July 1, 1836, that authorized the President to appoint an agent to
enforce the United States' right to Smithson's property. 8 7  Invoking its
made available as a result of an appropriation by the Congress of the United States directly to the
Institution." Wolcott, 43 Fed. Cl. at 582 (internal citation omitted).
181. See Wolcott, 43 Fed. Cl. at 585 (noting that the plaintiffs "were specifically appointed as
trust fund employees and not as civil service employees"); Bisson, 908 F.2d at 950 (asserting that
as a private-roll employee, the plaintiff was not part of the civil service).
182. Gingery v. Dep't of Def., 550 F.3d 1347, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2008). The excepted service
"consists of those civil service positions which are not in the competitive service or the Senior
Executive Service." 5 U.S.C. § 2103(a) (2006); see 5 C.F.R. § 213.101 (2009). All employees
within the Federal Civil Service are therefore designated as holding positions in the competitive
service, the excepted service, or the Senior Executive Service.
183. 5 U.S.C. § 2102(a)(1).
184. Id. §2102(a)(2) (emphasis added).
185. See id. § 2102(a)(1)-(2) (stating that the competitive service includes all civil-service
positions in the executive branch and all non-executive branch positions included in the
competitive service by statute).
186. See supra Part I.A.
187. Act of July 1, 1836, ch. 252, § 1, 5 Stat. 64, 64 (conferring power on the President "to
constitute and appoint an agent or agents, to assert and prosecute for and in behalf of the United
States ... the right of the United States to the legacy bequeathed to them by the last will and
testament of James Smithson"); see 3 Op. Att'y Gen. 383, 384 (1838) (observing that Congress
empowered the President to appoint an agent to receive James Smithson's property). Under the
Act, it is not likely that "prosecute" was used as commonly understood today, but rather meant
"[t]o engage in; carry on." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1341 (9th ed. 20 09). Additionally, the
Act authorized the President to empower the appointed agent(s) to provide funding for the
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constitutional appointment power, 188  Congress gave the President the
responsibility of choosing an agent, or an inferior officer,' to ensure the
successful establishment of the Smithsonian. Although this action does not
necessarily indicate that the appointed inferior officer is part of the executive
branch, 190 that Congress delegated appointment authority to the President
establishment of the Institution. Act of July 1, 1836, ch. 252, § 1, 5 Stat. 64, 64. Therefore,
Congress empowered the President to appoint and confer authority upon an agent. Id.
188. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. The Appointments Clause of the United States Constitution
provides two ways for officers to be appointed: by the President "with the advice and consent of
the Senate," or by congressional decision to vest the power of appointment "in the President
alone, in the Courts of Law, or the Heads of Departments." Id. The appointment method used is
dictated by the nature of the appointee. The former appointment method concerns "Ambassadors,
other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the
United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for." Id. The latter
method applies to the appointment of inferior officers. Id. Because Congress provided the
President with the power to designate an agent of the Smithsonian, it can be inferred that
Congress considered this agent an inferior officer. See Act of July 1, 1836, ch. 252, § 1, 5 Stat.
64, 64.
189. Act of July 1, 1836, ch. 252, § 1, 5 Stat. 64, 64. There are two competing theories of
what is meant by "inferior officer." See Tuan Samahon, Are Bankruptcy Judges
Unconstitutional? An Appointments Clause Challenge, 60 HASTtNGS L.J. 233, 250 (2008). One
theory views these officers as subordinate to a higher officer, and the other views them as less
powerful, connoting the idea of being "petty or unimportant." Id. In Morrison v. Olson, the
Supreme Court espoused the latter view when considering whether the Attorney General's
appointment of independent counsel violated the Appointments Clause. Morrison v. Olson, 487
U.S. 654, 659-60 (1988). In concluding that the independent counsel was an inferior officer, the
Court outlined four factors it considered: (1) whether the officer may be removed by a higher
officer within the Executive Branch; (2) whether the officer may "perform only certain, limited
duties"; (3) whether the officer has a limited jurisdiction; and (4) whether the officer's tenure is
limited. Id. at 671-72. The majority opinion ultimately held that the independent counsel was
less powerful than the Attorney General, who was empowered to appoint her, and was therefore
an inferior officer. Id. In his dissent, Justice Antonin Scalia rejected the majority's
understanding of an inferior officer, instead stating that the identifying characteristic of an
inferior officer is that the person is subordinate to an officer in the Executive Branch. Id at 719
(Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 662 (1997) ("[Tlhe term
'inferior officer' connotes a relationship with some higher ranking officer or officers below the
President: Whether one is an 'inferior' officer depends on whether he has a superior."). Because
Justice Scalia did not view the independent counsel as subordinate, he deemed her appointment
unconstitutional. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 723 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
The agent of the Smithsonian likely qualified as an inferior officer under both views, being
both less powerful and subordinate. The agent meets the Morrison factors because he was
appointed to perform a specific task. See Act of July 1, 1836, ch. 252, § 1, 5 Stat. 64, 64.
Additionally, although the agent did not have a designated superior, he was subordinate to the
President because his task was to be carried out "for and in behalf of the United States." Act of
July 1, 1836, ch. 252, § 1, 5 Stat. 64, 64.
190. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 673. The Morrison Court observed that "'[ilt is no doubt
usual and proper to vest the appointment of inferior officers in that department of the government,
executive or judicial, or in that particular executive department to which the duties of such
officers appertain.'" Id. at 674 (quoting Exparte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 397 (1879)). The Court
noted, however, that the interbranch appointment of officers is not a constitutional requirement,
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under the "excepting clause"'191 and not to the heads of departments or the
Judiciary, 192 is certainly significant.
6. The Smithsonian Is Similar in Mission and Form to the National Archives
and Records Administration, a Recognized Independent Establishment
The Smithsonian also likely qualifies as an executive agency because it
performs functions similar to other recognized independent agencies in the
executive branch, such as the National Archives and Records Administration
(NARA). 193 The function of NARA is to "safeguard[] and preserve[] the
records of our Government, ensuring that the people can discover, use, and
learn from this documentary heritage."' 94  This is strikingly similar to the
Smithsonian's founding mission--"the increase and diffusion of knowledge
among men"195-and its function as a "steward to [the] nation's historic,
scientific, artistic, and cultural heritage."'
' 96
Other independent establishments perform wholly different functions,
including regulation and policymaking. 197  Nothing, however, denotes that
independent establishments engage in these functions. 198 Therefore, though
as the Appointments Clause gives Congress broad discretion in choosing in whom it will vest the
power to appoint. Id. at 673.
191. The Excepting Clause "authorizes Congress to opt out of the default constitutional
arrangement for appointment." See Samahon, supra note 189, at 249. The clause provides that,
with the exception of the appointment of Officers of the United States, "the Congress may by
Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone,
in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments," U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 2, thus eliminating
the Senate's involvement in appointments. See Samahon, supra note 189, at 249.
192. See Act of July 1, 1836, ch. 252, § 1, 5 Stat. 64, 64.
193. See 44 U.S.C. § 2102 (2006) ("There shall be an independent establishment in the
executive branch of the Government to be known as the National Archives and Records
Administration."); see also OFFICE OF THE FED. REGISTER, NAT'L ARCHIVES & RECORDS
ADMIN., supra note 60, at 447 ("NARA was established as an independent agency in the
executive branch of the Government by act of October 19, 1984 ...."). Although Title 44 does
not define independent establishment, other Titles of the Code may be helpful in defining the
term. See 5 U.S.C. § 104 (2006) (defining independent establishment).
194. OFFICE OF THE FED. REGISTER, NAT'L ARCHIVES & RECORDS ADMIN., supra note 60,
at 445; see 44 U.S.C. § 2109 (2006) ("The Archivist shall provide for the preservation,
arrangement, repair and rehabilitation, duplication and reproduction . ..of records or other
documentary material transferred to him ....
195. 20 U.S.C. § 41 (2006).
196. MANAGEMENT'S DISCUSSION, supra note 3, at 1.
197. See OFFICE OF THE FED. REGISTER, NAT'L ARCHIVES & RECORDS ADMIN., supra note
60, at 380. For example, the Environmental Protection Agency was "created to permit
coordinated and effective governmental action on behalf of the environment" and "designed to
serve as the public's advocate for a livable environment." Id. Additionally, the Federal Labor
Relations Authority, which is an independent establishment, was created "to consolidate the
central policymaking functions in Federal labor-management relations." Id. at 409.
198. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 104 (2006). It is nowhere defined as necessary that independent
establishments perform regulatory functions. This undercuts the Dong court's reasoning that,
because the Smithsonian "does not make binding rules of general application or determine rights
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the Smithsonian may be distinguishable from independent establishments that
perform regulatory and policymaking functions, it is not necessarily barred
from being defined as an independent establishment in the executive branch.
Moreover, that the Institution has a mission similar to statutorily defined
independent establishments supports its characterization as such.
C. The Smithsonian Is an Independent Establishment
The Smithsonian's many characteristics, 99 along with its employment of
persons within the competitive service,
20 and its similarities to NARA 201
strongly suggest that the Smithsonian is an independent establishment as
defined by 5 U.S.C. § 104. As a result, the Smithsonian conforms to the
statutory definition of executive agency under Title 5 and all other provisions
that borrow this definition.
202
III. THE SMITHSONIAN'S STATUS AS AN INDEPENDENT ESTABLISHMENT AND
AN EXECUTIVE AGENCY SUBJECTS IT TO CODE PROVISIONS AND EXECUTIVE
ORDERS
The Smithsonian's identity as an executive agency, although providing
clarity of purpose and identity, threatens the very existence of the Smithsonian
Institution. The Smithsonian is a thriving establishment that captures the
attention of millions annually203 and "offers the world a picture of America and
America a picture of the world. 20 4 It houses renowned artifacts such as the
illustrious Hope Diamond, the Star Spangled Banner of Francis Scott Key's
inspiring anthem, and the Wright brothers' original Flyer.205 In addition, the
Smithsonian provides valuable research that spans disciplines and geographic
locations.
206
and duties through adjudication" and that it "issues no orders and performs no regulatory
functions," it is not an executive agency. See Dong v. Smithsonian Inst., 125 F.3d 877, 882 (D.C.
Cir. 1997).
199. See supra Parts I.A, II.B.5.
200. See supra Part I.E (discussing the Smithsonian's employment of persons in the
competitive service).
201. See supra Part I.B.6 (discussing the Smithsonian's similarities to NARA).
202. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 104-105 (2006) (defining independent establishments and including
them in the list of entities encompassed in the term executive agency).
203. See MANAGEMENT'S DISCUSSION, supra note 3, at I ("More than 24 million people
from across the country and around the world came to the Smithsonian during [fiscal year 2008],
and almost 173 million more visited [the Smithsonian's] various websites."). In addition, the
Smithsonian's fifty-eight traveling exhibits attracted approximately 5.15 million visitors. Id. app.
B, at 1.
204. Id. at 1.
205. Id. app. B, at 4.
206. Id. app. B, at 6-7 (noting that the Smithsonian has been referred to as a "storehouse of
ideas").
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Given that the Institution is flourishing and is succeeding in its mission to
"increase and [diffuse] knowledge among men" 2 07-and has been since its
codification-it may seem futile to defog the denotative uncertainty
surrounding it. The implications of being an independent establishment,
however, are significant.
Being an independent establishment subjects the Smithsonian to all Title 5
provisions that apply to executive agencies, as well as all statutes, regulations,
208and executive orders that incorporate Title 5's definition.
A. As an Executive Agency, the Smithsonian Is Subject to Provisions of the
Hatch Act
As an executive agency, the Smithsonian must comply with the Hatch
Act.20 9  The Hatch Act 2 ° is a Title 5 provision that restricts the political
activity 211 of federal employees, specifically those employed by an executive
agency.21 2 Among its restrictions, an employee may not "use his official
authority or influence" to impact election results, 2 13 solicit political
contributions, 2 14 or be a candidate in a partisan election. 215 The Act resulted
from congressional concern that federal employees would trade certain benefits
that accompany public employment for personal and political gain.
216
207. 20 U.S.C. § 41 (2006).
208. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 104-105 (2006) (defining independent establishment and including it
within the definition of executive agency). This Comment does not attempt to address the
question of whether the Smithsonian is subject to FOIA, the FTCA, the Privacy Act, or the
Property Act because these provisions define "agency" internally. See supra Part L.C-D. Rather,
cases examining these statutes are used to explore the analysis courts use in determining the
Smithsonian's identity. See supra Part L.C-D.
209. See 5 U.S.C. § 7322(l)(A). Because the Hatch Act is a Title 5 provision and does not
define executive agency internally, 5 U.S.C. § 105 provides the applicable definition.
210. 5 U.S.C. §§ 7321-7326. A separate series of Hatch Act provisions apply to state and
local employees with duties in connection with federally funded activities. See id. §§ 1501-1508.
Because of its scope in analyzing Smithsonian employees who are federal employees, this
Comment focuses only on those Hatch Act provisions applicable to federal employees. See id. §§
7321-7326.
211. Id. §§ 7323-7324, 7326 (discussing activity prohibited under the Hatch Act). "Political
activity" is defined as "activity directed toward the success or failure of a political party,
candidate for partisan political office, or partisan political group." 5 C.F.R. § 734.101 (2009).
212. 5 U.S.C. § 7322(l)(A)-(B) (defining employee as "any individual, other than the
President and the Vice President, employed or holding office in ... an Executive agency other
than the Government Accountability Office; [and] a position within the competitive service which
is not in an Executive agency").
213. Id. § 7323(a)(1).
214. Id. § 7323(a)(2).
215. Id. § 7323(a)(3).
216. Steven J. Eberhard, The Need for the Hatch Act, I HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 153, 188
(1978) (discussing the concern that "corrupt public employees would demand political favors in
return for the benefits of the governmental programs they were charged with administering").
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Given that the Smithsonian is likely an independent establishment, 217 and
therefore, an executive agency, employees of the Institution would be
restricted by the Hatch Act, 2 1 which limits their ability to run for office and- 219
engage in political campaigns.
B. The Smithsonian Is Subject to Statutes that Employ Title 5 "s Definition of
Executive Agency
Classifying the Smithsonian as an executive agency would also subject it to
statutes outside of Title 5 that borrow the definition of executive agency from 5
U.S.C. § 105. 22' For example, executive agencies must comply with a Title 49
provision that regulates vehicles used or purchased by executive agencies, and
dictates the fuel standards that they must meet and maintain. 22  Furthermore,
executive agencies are subject to a Title 42 statute relating to noise control and
regulation. 2 2  The statute requires executive agencies to work with the
Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency to implement
217. See supra Part II.C.
218. Additionally, the Hatch Act specifically applies to persons holding positions in the
competitive service. Id. § 7322(1)(B) ("'[E]mployee' means any individual, other than the
President and the Vice President, employed or holding office in a position within the competitive
service which is not in an Executive agency."); see supra note 212. Therefore, at least those
Smithsonian employees holding positions in the competitive service are subject to the provisions
of the Hatch Act.
219. See 5 U.S.C. § 7323(a). The Office of Personnel Management has promulgated
regulations that soften Hatch Act restrictions for federal employees living in certain
municipalities. See 5 C.F.R. § 733.103 (2009). For example, although the general provisions
prohibit employees from being candidates for partisan political office, 5 U.S.C. § 7323(a)(3),
those employees living in designated localities may "[run as independent candidates for election
to partisan political office in elections for local office in the municipality or political subdivision."
5 C.F.R. § 733.103(b)(1). Additionally, though federal employees are banned from "solicit[ing],
accept[ing] or receiv[ing] a political contribution," 5 U.S.C. § 7323(a)(2), subject, of course, to
certain exceptions, see 5 U.S.C. § 7323(a)(2)(A)-(C), those employees living in designated areas
may act "as, or on behalf of, an independent candidate for partisan political office in elections for
local office in the municipality or political subdivision." 5 C.F.R. § 733.103(b)(2). Moreover,
designated municipalities exempt from some Hatch Act restrictions include the Washington, D.C.
suburbs of Bethesda, Maryland; College Park, Maryland; Arlington County, Virginia; and
Alexandria, Virginia. Id. § 733.107. Employees living in these municipalities remain restricted,
albeit not as stringently, from engaging in certain political activity. See id.
220. See infra notes 221-26 and accompanying text.
221. 49 U.S.C. § 32917 (2006). The provision requires that "[t]he President shall prescribe
regulations that require passenger automobiles leased for at least 60 consecutive days or bought
by executive agencies in a fiscal year to achieve a fleet of average fuel economy ... for that year
of at least the greater of ... 18 miles a gallon" or the standard set forth for the model year. Id. §
32917(b) (emphasis added). Under § 32917, "'executive agency' has the same meaning given
that term in section 105 of title 5." Id. § 32917(a) (emphasis added).
222. 42 U.S.C. § 4903 (2006). Notably, this statute provides that "[t]he term 'Federal
agency' means an executive agency (as defined in section 105 of Title 5)." See id. § 4902(10)
(emphasis added).
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"standards or regulations respecting noise" 223 and install programs "relating to
• . . • . •,,224
noise research and noise control.
Moreover, executive agencies must comply with Title 31 regulations
concerning "conditions under which [the agencies] ... may accept payment, or
authorize an employee of such agency to accept payment on the agency's
behalf, from non-Federal sources for travel., 22  This likewise extends to
activities connected with any meetings or similar events that an employee mayS •226
attend as a result of his official duties.
C. As an Executive Agency, the Smithsonian Is Subject to Applicable
Executive Orders
Classification as an executive agency does not only subject the Smithsonian
to various statutes, but also mandates that it follow Executive Orders
applicable to executive agencies.
227
223. Id. § 4903(c)(2). Once the agency implements these standards, the Administrator of the
Environmental Protection Agency is responsible for ensuring that such programs and initiatives
are followed. Id. (explaining that "[i]f at any time the Administrator has reason to believe that a
standard or regulation, or any proposed standard or regulation, of any Federal agency respecting
noise does not protect the public health and welfare to the extent he believes to be required and
feasible" he may ask the agency to provide a report assessing potential changes to established
standards that would achieve this goal). The statute also dictates how the Administrator's
responsibility is executed, requiring publishing requests for agency compliance and the agency's
statements of review in the Federal Register. Id. As an executive agency, the Smithsonian would
be subject to review by the Environmental Protection Agency for noise control compliance.
224. Id. § 4903(c)(1).
225. 31 U.S.C. § 1353(a) (2006); see id § 1353(c)(1) (adopting the Title 5 definition of
executive agency). Compliance with this statute may be especially significant for the
Smithsonian because part of its budget comes from trust-fund monies, which are non-Federal
dollars. See supra note 180 and accompanying text. In addition, Smithsonian employees likely
are governed by this statute because some employees engage in work-related travel. See, e.g.,
Dong v. Smithsonian Inst., 125 F.3d 877, 877 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (finding that a Hirshorn Museum
employee was required to travel by virtue of her position with the Smithsonian because "her
duties include[d] serving as a courier for works of art the Hirshorn lends to other museums").
226. 31 U.S.C. § 1353(a).
227. See infra notes 228-33 and accompanying text. Executive orders have been called "a
venerable category of presidential directives." PATTERSON, supra note 51, at 274. These
directives typically are aimed at the federal government, id., and range from those that alter the
history of the nation to those that establish presidential advisory commissions. Compare Exec.
Order No. 9066, 3 C.F.R. 1092, 1092-93 (1938-1943) (authorizing the establishment of
internment camps during World War II), with Exec. Order No. 13,090, 63 Fed. Reg. 36,151,
36,151 (July 2, 1998) (establishing the President's Commission on the Celebration of Women in
American History under the Clinton Administration), revoked by Exec. Order No. 13,225, 3
C.F.R. 791 (2002). An executive order typically specifies its statutory authority, PATTERSON,
supra note 51, at 274, and then provides entities to which it will apply definitions of terms
contained therein, and action to be executed. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,513, 74 Fed. Reg.
51,225, 51,225-26 (Oct. 6, 2009); Exec. Order No. 13,186, 66 Fed. Reg. 3853, 3853-55 (Jan. 17,
2001).
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On October 5, 2009, President Barack Obama issued Executive Order
13,514, mandating that federal agencies perform a variety of tasks in an effort
"to create a clean energy economy." 228 The order lists very specific goals for
agencies, including "reducing potable water consumption intensity by 2
percent annually through fiscal year 2020. ",229 The Order specifies that it
applies to "executive agenc[ies] as defined in section 105 of title 5. '
Executive Order 13,513 similarly defines agency. 23  This directive calls for
"[a]ll agencies of the executive branch" to implement initiatives aimed at
prohibiting employees from sending text messages while driving.232 Although
this may be a simple directive, it is nonetheless worth acknowledging that
Executive Orders that apply generally to executive agencies as defined in 5
U.S.C. § 105 also apply to the Smithsonian as an executive agency.233
D. Congress Should Tread Carefully in Treating the Smithsonian as an
Independent Establishment
The ramifications of the Smithsonian's characterization as an independent
establishment and, thereby, an executive agency, are far from slight. The
several examples listed above of various statutes and directives with which the
Smithsonian must comply, given its status as an executive agency, impose
strict standards and mandates. 4 Although some of these may be less intrusive
235than others, such as the prohibition on employee text messaging, the
implications of 31 U.S.C. § 1353, outlining provisions concerning the
acceptance of non-federal funds for employee travel, 236 and Executive Order
23713,514, detailing energy-related mandates, are far more demanding.
Additionally, the limitations of the Hatch Act affect the type of employee the
228. Exec. Order No. 13,514, 74 Fed. Reg. 52,117, 52,117 (Oct. 8, 2009).
229. Id. at 52,118. The Order requires that the head of each agency "divert[] at least 50
percent of non-hazardous solid waste, excluding construction and demolition debris, by the end of
fiscal year 2015." Id.
230. Id. at 52,125 (emphasis added).
231. Exec. Order No. 13,513, 74 Fed. Reg. 51,225, 51,226 (Oct. 6, 2009) ("The term
agency' as used in this order means an executive agency, as defined in 5 U.S.C. [§] 105."
(emphasis added)).
232. Id. at 51,225. The Executive Order specifically requires that "[f]ederal employees shall
not engage in text messaging (a) when driving [government-owned, government-leased, or
Government-rented vehicles], or when driving [privately-owned vehicles] while on official
Government business, or (b) when using electronic equipment supplied by the Government while
driving." Id.
233. The President, however, may exclude entities from an Executive Order's reach. See,
e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,186, 66 Fed. Reg. 3853, 3853 (Jan. 17, 2001) (specifically excluding
independent establishments from the definition of federal agency in an Order regulating
protection for migratory birds).
234. See supra Parts IlA, 11I.B.
235. See supra note 232 and accompanying text.
236. See supra notes 225-26 and accompanying text.
237. See supra notes 228-30 and accompanying text.
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Smithsonian may hire.238 Restrictions on political activity, especially in the
nation's capital, may deter some from considering employment at the
Institution.
Following nuanced orders and directives, as well as personnel provisions,
could alter the nature of the Smithsonian and subject it to executive and
congressional control.239 Although this would eliminate divergent opinions
and convoluted analysis in judicial decisions, this clarity may not be an
advantage worth having.
This Comment consistently emphasized the unique nature of the
Smithsonian Institution and its treasured place in American culture. 240 It
serves as a storehouse, a research center, a teaching tool, a window into varied
cultures, and, most significantly, a source of American pride. Accordingly, the
Institution should be treated as an independent establishment, but in the
241
colloquial sense of the term, separate from the workings of government.
Congress, therefore, should consider defining the Smithsonian consistently.
It is widely confusing to subject the Institution explicitly to certain statutes,
implicitly exclude it from others, and leave the rest up to judicial
242interpretation. Moreover, the Smithsonian's designation as an executive
agency may prove damaging and detract from its mission. If Congress is
interested in preserving the unique place the Smithsonian holds in the United
States, and in the world, it should explicitly define the Institution as something
wholly other. Correspondingly, Congress should promulgate a set of
provisions, in addition to the Smithsonian's original charter, to govern its
existence in today's era of regulation and oversight.
IV. CONCLUSION
Despite convoluted case law and conflicting statutory interpretations, it is
clear that the Smithsonian should be considered an executive agency given the
definition provided by Title 5. So denoted, the statutes and directives with
which the Institution must comply would be more clearly apparent to courts,
Congress, and the Smithsonian alike.
Although it would enjoy clarity of purpose and statutory identity, extraneous
regulation and onerous directives may threaten the Institution's place in
American society. Accordingly, Congress should establish a means of
oversight and regulation that provides appropriate directives to promote the
purpose and unique nature of America's beloved institution.
238. See supra notes 218-19 and accompanying text.
239. See discussion supra Part IILA-C.
240. See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text.
241. The Smithsonian should not be classified as an independent establishment as the term is
defined in 5 U.S.C. § 104. Rather, it should be considered wholly separate from the government,
and, therefore, subject to different regulations and provisions supporting its unique mission.
242. See supra Part I.C-D.
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